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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,

:
:

v.

:

RUSSELL DAVID HARRY,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20070025-CA

:

The trial court in this case gave a deadlocked jury a supplemental instruction
urging it to reach a unanimous verdict. Such an instruction is called an "Allen" charge.
See Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492 (1896). Courts have criticized use of the
traditional Allen charge where it serves to coerce a verdict, places undue pressure on a
dissenting juror, contains incorrect statements of law, is invasive, and/or is irrelevant and
improper. (See Brief of Appellant, dated November 2, 2007, Argument A.2.) Courts in
other jurisdictions have rejected the traditional charge in favor of the American Bar
Association standards for deadlocked juries. (Id.); see also ABA Stds for Criminal
Justice Discovery and Trial by Jury, § 15-5.4 (3d ed. 1996).
Since the verdict-urging instruction here was based on the traditional Allen charge,
Appellant Russell Harry has asked this Court to reject it and to disavow its use in favor of
the ABA standards. The ABA standards are reasonable and balanced. See, e.g., id.,
Commentary. They do not pressure a dissenting juror to reconsider her views in
deliberations in light of the majority opinion, and they are non-coercive. IcL

In response, the State maintains the ABA standards are "not warranted" (Brief of
Appellee, 42), and it argues in favor of the embattled Allen charge. Notably, the State
falls short of giving the traditional charge real support. It cites to no legal authority that
would approve of the language used in the traditional Allen instruction in this case, but
instead seems to claim the instruction could have been worse. (See, e.g., Brief of
Appellee, 29-30, 31). The State makes no attempt to distinguish the instruction here from
instructions rejected in cases across the nation, likely because the instruction here is
indistinguishable. Also, the State cites favorably in its brief to Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484
U.S. 231 (1988). Yet the instruction in Lowenfield embraced the ABA standards.
In the end, the traditional Allen instruction the trial court used here was coercive
and improper. This Court may reject that instruction and support the ABA standards.
ARGUMENT
THE INSTRUCTION IN THIS CASE CONTAINED STATEMENTS THAT
COURTS HAVE DISAVOWED AS IMPROPER AS A MATTER OF LAW.
THE STATE DOES NOT DISPUTE THAT ASSESSMENT.
A. HARRY HAS ASKED THIS COURT TO DISAVOW USE OF THE
TRADITIONAL ALLEN INSTRUCTION IN THIS JURISDICTION IN FAVOR
OF THE ABA STANDARDS. THAT REQUEST IS APPROPRIATE AND
SUPPORTED BY UTAH LAW.
The Utah Supreme Court has acknowledged that a verdict-urging instruction has
the potential to be coercive. See State v, Brown, 853 P.2d 851, 861 (Utah 1992) (stating
Allen instructions have been "criticized as tending to pressure jurors into giving up their
sincere convictions merely because a majority reached a different conclusion";
acknowledging "a supplemental instruction has the potential to be coercive, depending on
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its content, if given to jurors who have reached an impasse"); State v. Medina, 738 P.2d
1021, 1022 n.l (Utah 1987) (recognizing "many courts have expressed concern about the
continued propriety of the \Allen] instruction because of its perceived tendency to
pressure jurors to give up their sincere convictions simply because a majority takes a
different view"); see also State v. Thomas, 111 P.2d 445, 448 (Utah 1989) (recognizing
the instruction in Thomas's case did not contain language criticized by other courts).
However, the Utah Supreme Court has not addressed the distinct question of
whether trial courts should discontinue use of the traditional Allen charge with deadlocked juries and should look instead to the preferred ABA standards for guidance, likely
because that issue has not been before the court. See_ Brown, 853 P.2d at 861 (recognizing the instruction at issue in Brown's case was not given to deadlocked jurors);
Medina, 738 P.2d at 1022-23 (recognizing the issue in Medina's case was not properly
preserved, consequently, "[w]e do not have occasion to reach" the issue of whether the
Allen charge is permissible); see also Thomas, 111 P.2d at 448 (recognizing the issue on
appeal in Thomas's case did not concern the content of the instruction, but whether the
instruction should have been in writing: defendant argues "the judge should not have
brought the jury back into the courtroom for further instructions, but instead should have
sent into the jury room a written instruction to them to continue their deliberation").
In addition, this Court has recognized the coercive effects of a verdict-urging
instruction. In State v. Lactod, 761 P.2d 23 (Utah Ct. App. 1988), it considered whether
any form of a supplemental instruction may be given to a deadlocked jury, uL at 29; and
it ruled that such an instruction may be given if it is "non-coercive." IcL at 30.
3

Also, this Court will review a supplemental instruction to determine whether (1)
the language is coercive per se9 or (2) whether it is coercive under the circumstances of
the case. Id, Notably, this Court did not specifically affirm or disavow use of a traditional Allen instruction in the Lactod case. See, e.g., Lactod, 161 P.2d at 31 (recognizing
"inherently coercive ideas" that should not be included "in an Allen charge").
In this case, Harry has challenged the traditional Allen charge as coercive. (See
Brief of Appellant, Argument). This Court should disavow use of such a charge with
deadlocked juries. (See id.) This Court may decide that issue.
Indeed, contrary to the State's suggestions (see Brief of Appellee, 42-43 (stating
"this Court may not disavow" use of the traditional Allen instruction and citing to the rule
of "vertical stare decisis")), this Court has the judicial power and authority to reject the
traditional Allen charge in favor of the ABA standards. Such a determination would in no
way conflict with the decisions of the Utah Supreme Court. See_ Brown, 853 P.2d at 861
(acknowledging criticism surrounding the traditional Allen charge; ruling the trial court in
Brown's case did not give a verdict-urging instruction during deliberations); Medina, 738
P.2d at 1022 n.l, 1023 (recognizing criticism surrounding the traditional Allen
instruction; ruling the issue in Medina's case was not properly preserved); Thomas, 111
P.2d at 448 (recognizing the issue on appeal did not concern the content of the
instruction, but rather, whether the instruction should have been in writing); see also
Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30 (allowing trial courts to use "non-coercive" supplemental
instructions, and recognizing approval for ABA standards).
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In addition, "a rule of law pronounced by a panel [of this Court will] govern[] all
later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other panels of [the] court and all
courts of lower rank." Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677, 681 (Utah 1995)
(internal cites omitted). This Court has authority and jurisdiction to decide the issue here,
and its ruling will be binding statewide, whether it is "constitutionally based or not." Id.
Thus, Court may disavow the traditional Allen charge in favor of the ABA standards.
B. THE STATE HAS ASKED THIS COURT TO UPHOLD LANGUAGE IN
THE INSTRUCTION HERE; HOWEVER, IT HAS FAILED TO CITE TO
LEGAL AUTHORITY FOR THAT LANGUAGE.
Considering the Lactod analysis in this case, the trial court gave an Allen charge
that was coercive. As stated in the Brief of Appellant, the instruction was as follows:
ffll] All right. We're back on the record in the matter of the State of Utah
vs. Russell David Harry, Case No. 051908113. I want to note for the record that
all Counsel are present, as is Mr. Harry. Members of the jury, I'm going to ask
that you continue your deliberations in an effort to agree upon a verdict and
dispose of this case. I have a few additional comments I would like for you to
consider as you do so.
[f2] This is an important case. The trial has been expensive in time, effort
and money to both the defense and the prosecution. If you should fail to agree on
a verdict, the case is left open and must be tried again. Obviously another trial
would only serve to increase the costs to both sides; and there is no reason to
believe that the case can be tried again by either side better or more exhaustively
than it has been tried before you.
fl|3] Any future jury must be selected in the same manner and from the
same source as you were chosen; and there is no reason to believe that the case
could ever be submitted to eight men and women more conscientious, more
impartial, or more competent to decide it; . . . or that more or clearer evidence
could be produced on behalf of either side.
fl[4] In order to bring eight minds to a unanimous result, you must examine
the questions submitted to you with candor and frankness and with proper
deference to and regard for the opinions of each other. That is to say in conferring
together, each of you should pay due attention and respect to the views of the
others, and listen to each other's arguments with the disposition to re-examine your
own views.
5

fl[5] If a substantial majority of your number are for a conviction, each
dissenting juror ought to consider whether a doubt in his or her own mind is a
reasonable one, since it appears to make no effective impression upon the minds of
so many equally conscientious fellow jurors, who bear the same responsibility,
serve under the same oath, and have heard the same evidence, with, we may
assume, the same attention and equal desire to arrive at the truth.
[f6] On the other hand, if a majority or even a lesser number of you are for
acquittal, the other jurors ought to seriously ask themselves again, and most
thoughtfully, whether they do not have a reason to doubt the correction of a
judgment, which is not shared by several of their fellow jurors, and whether they
should distrust the weight and sufficiency of evidence which fails to convince
several of their fellow jurors beyond a reasonable doubt.
fl[7] You are not partisans. You are judges; judges of the facts. Your sole
interest here is to seek the truth from the evidence in the case. Remember at all
times that no juror is expected to yield a conscientious conviction he or she may
have as to the weight or effect of the evidence; but remember also that after full
deliberation and consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree
upon a verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious
conviction.
flJ8] You must also remember that if the evidence in the case fails to
establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the accused should have your
unanimous verdict of not guilty. In order to make a decision more practicable in
all cases imposes the burden of proof on one party or the other. In this case the
burden of proof is on the State. You may be as leisurely in your deliberations as
the occasion may require, and should take all the time which you may feel is
necessary, including recessing until tomorrow.
ffl9] I will ask now that you retire once again, and continue your
deliberations with these additional comments in mind to be applied in conjunction
with all of the instructions I have previously given to you. Members of the jury, I
will have this instruction copied and sent in shortly. All rise.
(R. 295:231-33) (those portions of the transcript containing the supplemental instruction
are attached to the Brief of Appellant as Addendum C).
The verdict-urging instruction here overemphasized the importance of agreement,
placed undue pressure on a dissenting juror, contained incorrect statements of law,
contained improper and irrelevant information, commented on the evidence, and invaded
the province of the jury. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument B.)
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Indeed, several courts have criticized language used by the trial court in the
verdict-urging instruction in this case. (See Brief of Appellant, Argument B.l. (citing
inter alia, People v. Gainer, 566 P.2d 997 (Cal. 1977); Lewis v. State, 424 N.E.2d 107
(Ind. 1981); State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639 (La. 1975); State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d
765 (Minn. 1973); State v.Garza, 176 N.W.2d 664 (Neb. 1970); State v. Czachor, 413
A.2d 593 (N.J. 1980); Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975); U.S. v. Fioravanti,
412 F.2d 407 (3d Cir.), cert, denied, 396 U.S. 837 (1969))).
The State does not seriously dispute the criticisms and it does not distinguish the
cases. (See Brief of Appellee, 25-41). Instead, it seems to claim that the Allen charge
here served simply to explain things to the jury. (See Brief of Appellee, 25, 28, 30, 31,
32 (referring to language in the Allen charge as "suggestions]", "explain[ations]," a
"simple reference," and "innocuous")). The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit considered such characterizations by the government to be insincere. It stated,
As a preliminary matter, we address the government's contention that we should
reject Mr. McElhiney's Allen charge argument outright because the district court's
comments were simply "observations" and not an instruction. This contention
seems calculated so as to sidestep any Allen charge analysis, and we find it
unconvincing.
First, the district court did not simply provide "observations" as the government
asserts; in making its comments, the district court directed the jury to deliberate
further, thus providing an instruction. Second, the instruction given by the district
court was "Allen " in nature: though "not like any Allen charge which we have
faced before, it serve[d] the same purpose" (i.e., to encourage a unanimous
verdict), "was given in an Allen situation" (i.e., a deadlocked jury), and was
"fraught with the same . . . potential for coercion." Finally, even if the district
court's comments did not constitute an instruction (Allen or otherwise), its remarks
still had the potential to coerce the jury, and, as coercion is the primary concern
with the giving of an Allen instruction, the overall Allen analysis would still be
applicable. In other words, the district court's comments would be examined
7

under all the circumstances to determine whether the verdict reached by the jury
was a product of impermissible coercion.
U.S. v. McElhinev, 275 F.3d 928, 941 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal cites omitted). Indeed,
the proper analysis in this case supports that the Allen charge was coercive.
1. The Supplemental Instruction Was Coercive Per Se.
The Instruction Was Coercive and Overemphasized the Importance of Agreement.
The State has acknowledged that the verdict-urging instruction encouraged the jury to
reach unanimity for a verdict. (See Brief of Appellee, 25). The instruction here emphasized agreement by admonishing jurors to continue deliberations "in an effort to agree
upon a verdict and dispose of this case" (R. 295:231, [f 1]); it advised jurors that if they
failed to reach agreement, "the case is left open and must be tried again" (id., [f2]); it emphasized the expense of trial and increased costs of retrial (id., fl[2]); it expressed that a
more conscientious jury could not be empaneled, thereby sending the message that deadlock constituted failure and wasted resources (R. 295:231-32, fl[3]); it discussed bringing
"eight minds to a unanimous result" (id., fl[4]); it encouraged jurors in the minority or
bare majority to reconsider their position in light of the numerical division and the fact
that several jurors disagreed or did not share in that view (R. 295:232-33, [ffl[5, 6]); and
it stated that jurors had a duty to agree upon a verdict if they could do so (UL, [f7]).
Notwithstanding the above, the State suggests that the trial court's emphasis on
agreement was "counterbalance^]" or "balanced" by language cautioning jurors "not to
give up their conscientiously held opinions," and language reminding the jury of the pre-
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sumption of innocence and the State's burden of proof. (Brief of Appellee, 25-26, 40).l
Courts in other jurisdictions have rejected the claim that such language gives
balance to an otherwise coercive instruction. See State v. Martin, 211 N.W.2d 765, 770
(Minn. 1973) (stating an instruction - advising jurors not to sacrifice their conscientious
convictions and admonishing them to consider that their judgment has been opposed by
others - is "incompatible" with a process that guides jurors in deliberation).
In Kersey v. State, 525 S.W.2d 139 (Tenn. 1975), the court recognized "an
inherent inconsistency in these charges in that the dissenters are urged to reconsider their
verdict and simultaneously are reminded to make their decisions based upon their own
convictions which they are cautioned not to sacrifice. [The instructions] ask the dissenters to consider shifting their opinions, because the majority is of a different persuasion.
We find no merit to any suggestion that might necessarily makes right." Id. at 144.
In addition, in State v. Czachor, 413 A.2d 593, 596 (N.J. 1980), the court
recognized that balancing language would not salvage the instruction:
Although the language of the Allen charge contains a reminder that the jurors
should vote only for a verdict with which they conscientiously agree, it may easily
influence a minority juror to acquiesce in the majority vote. The charge is
expressly directed at the minority jurors. They are importuned to reconsider their
decision with a disposition to being convinced and told of their duty to decide the
case if they can conscientiously do so. The emphasis of the charge is upon
reaching a verdict, not upon voting one's conscientious convictions, and it hardly
seems unreasonable that the jury, already frustrated by its inability to agree, will
1

Notably, the language referenced by the State is contained in paragraph 7 with
additional language urging a verdict. It states, "but remember also that after full
deliberation and consideration of the evidence in the case, it is your duty to agree upon a
verdict if you can do so without surrendering your conscientious conviction." (R.
295:233 (emphasis added)). Also, in paragraph 8, the trial court suggested the jury may
have to return "tomorrow" if necessary for more deliberations. (R. 295:233).
9

attach [the latter] meaning to [the instruction]. Moreover, since the majority is not
usually urged to reconsider its position, there is an implication, buttressed by the
particularly powerful position of the judge giving the instruction, that the majority
is correct and that the minority should yield its position and conform to the
majority. Even if the Allen charge may not in fact be coercive in a particular fact
situation, at best it injects a temptation to the jury to settle for majority rule rather
than the impartial individual determination of each juror.
Id_ at 399 (emphasis added) (citing Note, Due Process, Judicial Economy and the Hung
Jury: A Reexamination of the Allen Charge, 53 Va.L.Rev. 123, 143 (1967)).
Also, the court stated,
It is fair to say that the typical Allen charge does not simply remind jurors of their
duty to cooperate in collective deliberations. It has a rather different thrust. The
charge is intended to undo a jury deadlock. It tends therefore to focus upon
possibly the weakest links in the chain locking the jury in disagreement, namely,
the minority holdouts on the jury. Hence, the charge usually admonishes
specifically and pointedly only those in the minority to reconsider their beliefs in
light of the adverse position held by the majority. It also exerts pressures upon
jurors by casting indirectly upon them a personal responsibility and sense of guilt
for the impasse. It does so through various references to such matters as the
expense and waste of a mistrial, the need for a retrial, and the cost and
inconvenience of a new trial. The charge further intimates that the dissenting
jurors may not be acting properly or conscientiously since another similar jury will
be called upon in a new trial to perform the identical task and presumably will
achieve it, i.e., reach a unanimous verdict on the same evidence. Moreover,
dissenting jurors are usually asked to consider these extraneous factors at a time
when they are most vulnerable to judicial suasion to compose differences.
M a t 398-99.
In this case, the Allen instruction contained each offensive element referenced in
the Czachor decision. (See R. 295:231-33 (e.g., focusing on the dissenting juror and
admonishing her to reconsider her beliefs in light of the majority position flff 5, 6];
making reference to such matters as the expense and waste of a mistrial, the need for a
retrial, and the cost and inconvenience of a new trial [ffl[2, 3]; intimating failure with this
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jury where a similar jury would have to be called upon to perform the task and would be
asked to consider the same evidence to achieve a verdict [f3])). The trial court's central
message here urged unanimity, the message was delivered in a variety of ways, and the
repetition would have left an indelible impression. (See R. 295:231-33). In addition,
where the instruction spoke to a juror in the minority, that message carried weight, since
that juror was the final impediment to agreement. See_ Czachor, 413 A.2d at 398 (stating
that an Allen instruction tends to focus upon "the weakest links in the chain locking the
jury in disagreement, namely, the minority holdouts on the jury").
As the court in Czachor stated, "We simply have no confidence in the rule that
tolerates a coercive Allen charge on the supposed efficacy of balancing language to
overcome its inherent pressures. Since the fundamental right to a trial by an impartial
jury is at stake, we resolve our doubts against its continued use." Czachor, 413 A.2d at
401 (emphasis added); see also id. at 405 (recommending use of the ABA model).
In short, a conventional Allen charge, which was delivered here, contains blunt
and subtle pressures that cannot be rectified with purported balancing language. See
Czachor, 413 A.2d at 401 (expressing a lack of confidence in a rule that allows a conventional Allen charge "on the supposed efficacy of balancing language to overcome its
inherent pressures"); Kersey, 525 S.W.2d at 144 (stating "there is an inherent inconsistency" to an instruction that urges jurors not to sacrifice their individual decisions, and
asks the dissenters to "consider shifting their opinions, because the majority is of a
different persuasion"); see also State v. Nicholson, 315 So.2d 639, 642 (La. 1975) (stating
an Allen charge is confusing and "fails in its balancing attempt"; it urges conformity with
11

the majority (or near majority) view, and discredits the minority "if the minority is less
than substantial"). The instruction was improper. See Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (stating an
instruction should not overemphasize the importance of agreement).
The Instruction Contained Improper Information. As set forth in the Brief of
Appellant, the Allen instruction here contained irrelevant and incorrect information.
(Brief of Appellant, 31-33). It admonished jurors that the criminal case had been expensive, and if jurors failed to agree on a verdict, the case would have to be tried again
serving only to increase costs to both sides. (R. 295:231, [%2]). Also it advised jurors to
consider the numerical split in deliberations. (R. 295:232-33 (advising dissenting juror
for acquittal to consider whether her doubt was reasonable given that others were not so
impressed [f5]; advising jurors in the minority or bare majority for conviction to
reconsider, since their view was not shared by "several" fellow jurors fl[6])).
With respect to the admonition concerning the expense of trial and retrial, the
State dismisses those statements and claims (i) the trial court also "suggested" in the
instruction that the case "would not necessarily be retried" (see, e.g., Brief of Appellee,
28); (ii) the trial court's statement appeared to be correct since continued deadlock would
have resulted in retrial (id_ at 28-29); and (iii) the instruction in Lactod was worse: it
contained "much more potential to pressure the jury into reaching a verdict than those
presented by the trial court here." {IcL at 29-30). The State's claims are unavailing.
As reflected in the verdict-urging instruction here, the trial court did not retreat
from the claim that if the jury failed to reach a verdict, the case would have to be retried.
Rather, it admonished the jury that "[a]ny future jury must be selected" in the same
12

manner as this jury. (R. 295:231). Also, the court advised that a new case could not be
tried better or more exhaustively, the evidence would not be clearer, and any future jury
would not be more competent to decide the matter than this jury. (R. 295:231-32). The
admonition was intended to make the jury feel guilty for failing to reach a verdict; it
implied that deadlock increased costs and wasted resources. The language intimated that
jurors "may not be acting properly or conscientiously since another similar jury [would]
be called upon in a new trial to perform the identical task and presumably [would]
achieve it, i.e., reach a unanimous verdict on the same evidence." Czachor, 413 A.2d at
398-99. The language was improper.
In addition, it was incorrect as a matter of law for the trial court to say that the
case must be retried. As the court in Gainer stated,
[S]uch statements are legally inaccurate. It is simply not true that a criminal case
"must at some time be decided." The possibility of a hung jury is an inevitable
by-product of our unanimous verdict requirement. Confronted with a mistrial, the
[prosecution] retain[s] the authority to request dismissal of the action. Moreover,
this option is frequently exercised, as the criminal bar knows, when the
prosecution concludes that its inability to obtain a conviction stemmed from
deficiencies in its case. Thus the inconclusive judgment of a hung jury may well
stand as the final word on the issue of a defendant's guilt. Because an instruction
which implies that a hung jury will assuredly result in a retrial misstates the law,
the court erred in giving that portion of the charge stating "the case must at some
time be decided."
Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 (internal cites omitted); see also Martin, 211 N.W.2d at 769
(recognizing "it is simply not correct to state that a case must at some time be decided")
(citing Huffman v. U.S., 297 F.2d 754, 755 (5th Cir. 1962)); U.S. v. Brown, 411 F.2d 930,
933 (7th Cir. 1969) (recognizing that the Allen charge contains an "'untruth,' namely, the
admonition that the case 'must be retried' if the jury fails to reach a decision").
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And while the State suggests that retrial would have been necessary here because
"the State would not have simply abandoned the [possession] charge" (Brief of Appellee,
29), that is a false premise. The prosecutor's choices were not so limited. If a jury is
unable to reach a verdict because of deadlock, that result gives a prosecutor the
opportunity to reassess the validity of the charge, and/or the level of the offense for
purposes of negotiating the matter without further trial proceedings. Indeed, deadlock
would allow both parties to reassess the strengths and weaknesses of their respective
cases and the risks involved, perhaps for the entry of a plea on a related or lesser offense.
Such a plea would not require the prosecutor to abandon the charge and it would allow
resolution without retrial.
Where the instruction had the potential to pressure the jury, that is a basis for
rejecting it. See Fields v. State, 487 P.2d 831, 839 (Alaska 1971) (stating even if the
coercive effect were not "so apparent here, that is, if the coercive nature of this
instruction was a close question, we believe that pragmatic considerations and policy
require that the doubt be balanced in favor of the defendant and the case reversed. We
reach this conclusion because the coercive impact of a questionable charge is almost
always difficult to evaluate precisely on appeal"), overruled on other grounds as
recognized in State v. Patterson, 740 P.2d 944 (Alaska 1987).
Likewise, where the State has acknowledged that language contained in the
instruction concerning the expense of retrial can "[undoubtedly" "increase the coercive
effect of an Allen charge" (Brief of Appellee, 30), that is pertinent to the analysis. See
Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006 n.16 (stating that a common feature of an Allen-type instruction
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is "reference to the expense and inconvenience of a retrial"; such reference is "irrelevant
to the issue of defendant's guilt or innocence" and impermissible); Czachor, 413 A.2d at
596 (stating the thrust of an Allen instruction is to undo a deadlock, and this is
accomplished by exerting pressure upon jurors by "casting indirectly upon them a
personal responsibility and sense of guilt for the impasse. It does so through various
references to such matters as the expense and waste of a mistrial, the need for a retrial,
and the cost and inconvenience of a new trial").
With respect to the trial court's request that jurors consider the numerical split, the
State does not dispute that was improper. (See, e.g., Brief of Appellee, 28-30); see also
State v. Fajardo, 699 P.2d 20, 25 (Hawaii 1985) (stating numerical split "has no bearing
on the reasonableness of a juror's position"; it was "error for a trial court to encourage
jurors to consider such a factor" in deliberations). A verdict should reflect only a
decision based on the law and the evidence, not on statistics in the jury room. See Martin,
211 N.W.2d at 771 (citing to criticism against the Allen charge where it departs from
asking jury to base a verdict on the law and evidence, and instead directs it to be "influenced by some sort of Gallup Poll conducted in the deliberation room") (cite omitted).
The Trial Court *s Allen Instruction Commented on the Evidence. Harry maintains
that where the trial court admonished the jury that more evidence or "clearer evidence"
could not be presented (R. 295:232), that statement left jurors with the impression that
evidence was clear, and resolution was straightforward. (Brief of Appellant, 33). Also,
the trial court referred to the "weight and sufficiency of evidence". (R. 295:232-33).
Those admonitions were improper. (Brief of Appellant, 33-34). The State
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disagrees. (Brief of Appellee, 32-33). It claims the language "disavowed any notion that
the State would produce missing evidence in a retrial" and "cement[ed] the dissenting
juror's view of reasonable doubt" and gave "majority jurors pause" in their conclusion.
(Id.) The State's assertions are speculative. (See also, e.g., infra, pp. 17-18, herein).
Courts have criticized language used by the trial court here. See Lewis v. State,
424 N.E.2d 107, 110 (Ind. 1981) (stating language in supplemental instruction that
"[tjhere is no reason to believe that the case can be tried again any better or more
exhaustively than it has been,f and "[tjhere is no reason to believe that more evidence or
clearer evidence would be produced on behalf of either side," approaches commenting on
the evidence); Nicholson, 315 So.2d at 641-43 (considering Allen-type instruction to be
confusing). The supplemental instruction was improper and should be rejected.
The Instruction Targeted the Juror in the Minority; It Was Unbalanced and
Intimidating. The supplemental instruction as a whole was unfair and intimidating. It
targeted the juror in the minority, suggesting she surrender her independent judgment.
(See R. 295:232-33, [^[5,6]); see also Lactod, 761 P.2d at 31 (stating a supplemental
instruction should not suggest that any juror surrender his or her independent judgment).
The State disagrees. It claims "the jury understood that the judge was not intending to
force a verdict one way or the other, but rather, was merely encouraging the jurors to
reach an agreement if possible." (Brief of Appellee, 24 (quoting Lactod, 761 P.2d at
32)). That is incorrect.
Indeed, the State acknowledges that "language directed at [a] minority [of] jurors
has been criticized as 'an "unbalanced" charge which tends to coerce only the jurors in
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the minority to reconsider their positions."5 (Brief of Appellee, 34 (cite omitted)).
Moreover, "language directing jurors in the minority to consider the views of the majority
jurors, and not vice versa, may have a greater tendency to be coercive". (Id_ at 35). The
instruction here admonishing a juror in the clear minority (the dissenting juror) or the
bare majority to reconsider "was less than ideal." (Id.) Also, the instruction "departed]
from the ABA Standard by speaking to the minority juror[] and referencing the expenses
associated with a retrial." (Id, at 40 (emphasis added)).
According to the record, when the trial court gave the instruction in this case, the
jury was deadlocked seven to one. (R. 204; 295:227). The deadlock involved a single
dissenting juror and an overwhelming majority. In this case, the instruction did not admonish jurors in the overwhelming or clear majority to reconsider their position in light
of a dissenting vote. Thus, the principal message here was to a single dissenting juror.
Where the instruction expressly and explicitly advised a dissenting juror to
reconsider her opinion and it contained no reciprocating language for a split that involved
a clear majority, the instruction was unbalanced and unfair. (See R. 295:231-33); see
also Czachor, 413 A.2d at 596 ("An instruction that explicitly directs only the dissenters
to doubt the reasonableness of their convictions is inherently one-sided"). Such an
instruction "place[d] excessive and illegitimate pressures on the deliberating jury."
Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006. The charge tended to focus on the "weakest links in the chain
locking the jury in disagreement, namely, the minority holdout[] on the jury." Czachor,
413 A.2d at 596. It exerted pressure on that juror, casting indirectly on her a sense of
guilt for the impasse with references to "the expense and waste of a mistrial, the need for
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a retrial, and the cost and inconvenience of a new trial." Id; (see R. 295:231-32). The
instruction intimated that the dissenting juror "may not be acting properly or
conscientiously since another similar jury will be called upon in a new trial to perform
the identical task and presumably will achieve it, i.e., reach a unanimous verdict on the
same evidence." Czachor, 413 A.2d at 596; (R. 295:231-32 (admonishing dissenting
juror to reconsider where others are acting properly and conscientiously)).
Although the trial judge may not know "the identity of the particular dissenter[, ]
fellow jurors know, and the danger immediately arises that 'the Allen charge can
compound the inevitable pressure to agree felt by [a] minority juror[]." Gainer, 566 P.2d
at 1005 (cite omitted). The instruction here was coercive per se.
2. The Circumstances Support that the Instruction Coerced the Jury.
To determine whether a verdict-urging instruction was coercive under the
circumstances of the case, this Court has looked to certain factors. Lactod, 761 P.2d at
31. It has looked to "any colloquy between the judge and the jury foreman,
circumstances surrounding the giving of the instruction, and consideration of the
American Bar Association Standards on Criminal Justice Relating to Trial by Jury." Id
(cite omitted); see also State v. Torres, 82 S.W.3d 236, 257-58 (Tenn. 2002) (considering
the circumstances, including the length of the deliberations, the fact that the jury did not
request further instructions when it reported deadlock, the jury reported an unequivocal
deadlock, and the jury returned with a verdict "[j]ust one hour" after receiving the
supplemental instruction; also, ruling that the circumstances supported coercion in the
verdict); Tucker v. Catoe, 221 F.3d 600, 611 (4th Cir. 2000).
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Harry has discussed those factors in his brief to show that the circumstances here
supported coercion. (Brief of Appellant, Argument B.2. (considering the circumstances,
including (i) the length of deliberations, (ii) the colloquy between the court and jurors
during deliberations where jurors requested additional evidence and were denied that
request, (iii) the jury reported unequivocal deadlock on the possession count, (iv) the jury
did not request a supplemental instruction when it reported deadlock, (v) the Allen-type
instruction in this case did not comply with ABA standards, and (vi) the Allen-type
instruction as a whole pressured a single juror to reconsider her decision)).
In response, the State claims that the most relevant "fact" to consider is the
"polling of the jury after they returned the verdict," where each juror answered in the
affirmative when asked, "Were these and are these now your verdicts." (Brief of
Appellee, 37). The State's assessment disregards the circumstances of the case and
focuses only on the result. That assessment is irrelevant.
In this case, the trial court intended the verdict-urging instruction to end deadlock.
(See R. 295:228 (acknowledging instruction would advise jurors to think "long and hard
about deadlocking"; it would tell "the sole holdout" on the jury, "you might want to think
about that")). After it gave the instruction, the jury quickly returned a unanimous verdict,
with each juror affirming the verdict when polled. (R. 295:234-36). The polling as
identified by the State reflects that the instruction succeeded in placing "excessive and
illegitimate pressures" on the dissenting juror for a verdict. Gainer, 566 P.2d at 1006.
The instruction exerted such a sense of guilt on her that she changed her vote, not
because her view of the evidence changed, but because she believed she may not be
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acting properly since other jurors disagreed with her, and according to the admonition,
any other jury that would be called upon to decide the case would consider the same
evidence and presumably achieve a verdict. See Czachor, 413 A.2d at 596; (R. 295:23133 (advising dissenting juror, among other things, to reconsider since conscientious jurors
opposed her)).
Indeed, the facts reflect that "[w]hen the verdict-urging charge was delivered at
least one juror was opposed to conviction. Following its pronouncement, any dissenter
faced the alternative of surrendering [her] sincere conviction or compelling [her] fellows
to remain together indefinitely." Fields, 487 P.2d at 838. Here, the dissenting juror
completely "surrendered her] sincere conviction," id^ as reflected in the post-instruction
polling. {See R. 295:235-36). She did that because "the court made it very clear that in
its judgment a verdict could and should be arrived at. It was tantamount to telling the
dissenting juror that [s]he was wrong. The prestige of the court was used to bring [her]
into line with [her] fellow jurors. It presented a clear invasion of the rights of the jury
and prevented the defendant from having his fate determined by an impartial and
uncoerced jury." State v. Garza, 176N.W.2d 664, 667 (Neb. 1970).
Under the circumstances here, the verdict-urging charge invaded the province of
the jury. It was improper and should be rejected.
3. The State Cites Favorably to the Instruction Contained in Lowenfield;
Significantly, the Lowenfield Instruction Embodies the ABA Standards. This
Court May Reject the Instruction Here and Embrace the Lowenfield and ABA
Standards.
The State has cited favorably in its brief to the instruction that the United States
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Supreme Court upheld in Lowenfield v. Phelps, 484 U.S. 231 (1988). (See Brief of
Appellee, 14-16,36,41,42).
In Lowenfield, 484 U.S. 231, the defendant was charged with capital homicide in
connection with killing five people. IcL at 233. The jury convicted defendant on two
counts of manslaughter and three counts of first-degree murder. It then deliberated
whether defendant should receive the death penalty or life in prison. UL Prior to
sentencing deliberations, the trial court admonished jurors that they should "consider the
views of others with the objective of reaching a verdict, but that they should not surrender
their own honest beliefs in doing so. The court also charged the jury that if it were
unable to reach a unanimous recommendation, the court would impose a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of probation, parole, or suspension of sentence." IcL
at 234; see also, e.g., ABA Stds for Criminal Justice Discover and Trial by Jury, § 155.4(a)(3) (3d ed. 1996) (stating admonitions should be given before jury deliberates).
During the second day of deliberations, jurors advised the court they were "unable
to reach a decision" and they requested additional instructions "as to [their] responsibilities." Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 234. The trial court responded by asking jurors to
indicate on paper if further deliberation would be helpful. Eight answered affirmatively
and four answered negatively. IcL Jurors then advised the court that some of them
misunderstood the question, and the court again polled the jurors. "This time 11 jurors
answered in the affirmative and 1 answered in the negative." IcL at 234-35.
The trial court did not ask, and jurors did not reveal, the numerical division of
jurors with respect to the verdict. See, e.g., id. at 240 (specifying the trial court did not
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know the numerical division of jurors and where they stood on the merits of a verdict).
Indeed, jurors could have been equally split, with no majority and no minority decision.
Given the jurors' answers to the poll, the trial court provided a supplemental
instruction. The italicized language mirrored the ABA standards as follows:
Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you earlier if the jury is unable to
unanimously agree on a recommendation the Court shall impose the sentence of
Life Imprisonment without benefit of Probation, Parole, or Suspension of
Sentence.
When you enter the jury room it is your duty to consult with one another to
consider each other's views and to discuss the evidence with the objective of
reaching a just verdict ifyou can do so without violence to that individual
judgment. [See_ ABA Standard 15-5.4.(a)(2).]
Each ofyou must decide the case for yourself but only after discussion and
impartial consideration of the case with your fellow jurors. [See ABA Standard
15-5.4.(a)(3).] You are not advocates for one side or the other. Do not hesitate to
reexamine your own views and to change your opinion if you are convinced you
are wrong [see ABA Standard 15-5.4.(a)(4)] but do not surrender your honest
belief as to the weight and effect of evidence solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jurors or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict. [See^ ABA Standard
15-5.4.(a)(5).]
M at 235; see also ABA Stds for Criminal Justice Discover and Trial by Jury, § 155.4(a), (b) (3d ed. 1996). Defense counsel did not object to either poll or to the
supplemental instruction. Lowenfield, 484 U.S. at 235.
The jury resumed deliberations and returned within 30 minutes with a sentence of
death on all three counts of murder. IcL at 235. After a direct appeal and habeas
proceedings in the federal courts, the defendant asked the United States Supreme Court to
address the validity of the supplemental instruction. See id. at 235-37.
In its decision, the Supreme Court stated, "we consider the supplemental charge
given by the trial court 'in its context and under all the circumstances.'" IcL at 237. The
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Court found it relevant that the trial court did not use language that required the jury to
reach a decision in the case, since such language may have a coercive effect on the jury.
See id at 239 (citing Jenkins v. U.S., 380 U.S. 445, 446 (1965)). Also, the trial court did
not inquire into the jury's numerical division on the merits of the verdict. See_ id_ at 240.
Further, the Supreme Court was "mindful" that where the jury returned with its
verdict in sentencing "soon after receiving the supplemental instruction," that would
suggest the possibility of coercion. IcL at 240. However, in Lowenfield's case, the Court
considered the claim of coercion to be tenuous since defense counsel "did not object to
either [of the pre-instruction] polls or the supplemental instruction" provided at trial. IcL
at 240. Rather, counsel waited until appeal to claim coercion, thereby suggesting that
coercion "was not apparent" to the parties at trial and "on the spot." IcL
Finally, in its analysis, the Supreme Court recognized that the instruction at issue
in Lowenfield was "by no means" identical to the traditional Allen instruction. IcL at 237.
Indeed the Court did not specifically endorse the language of the traditional Allen
instruction. See, e.g., id. Rather, it stated that it would continue to give validity to the
observations made in Allen: that the "object of the jury system is to secure unanimity by a
comparison of views" and arguments among the jurors; that each juror should "listen
with deference to the arguments" of others and with "a distrust" for his own judgment "if
he finds a large majority of the jury taking a different view of the case" from how he
views it; and that a juror cannot go into the jury room blindly determined "that the verdict
shall represent his opinion of the case at that moment," and he cannot "close his ears to
the arguments" of other jurors "who are equally honest and intelligent." IcL at 237. The
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Court considered the observations to apply with greater force in a case where the
supplemental instruction "does not speak specifically" to a minority juror. IdL at 237-38.
The Supreme Court in Lowenfield stated that it relied on its supervisory powers
over federal courts to rule that a supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury may not
admonish the jury that "[y]ou have got to reach a decision in this case," jxL at 239 & n.2;
and trial courts may not inquire into the jury's numerical division on the verdict since a
supplemental instruction after such inquiry may bring to bear some degree of improper
influence upon jurors. IcL at 239-40. The Court upheld the ABA-type instruction in
Lowenfield's case. IcL
This Court has cited favorably to Lowenfield. See Lactod, 761 P.2d at 30. It
acknowledged Lowenfield's supplemental instruction, and supported use of a "noncoercive" charge "because we believe such charges to be a reasonable and proper
exercise of the court's power to guide the jury to a fair and impartial verdict." Id_
This Court ruled that a judge may "appropriately admonish the jury to 'deliberate
together in an atmosphere of mutual deference and respect giving due consideration to
the views of others in the knowledge that in the end their verdict must reflect the
composite views of all.' He may counterbalance such an admonition with a charge to the
jury members to not give up their conscientiously held opinions, and may also remind the
jurors of the presumption of defendant's innocence and the burden of proof imposed upon
the state." IdL at 30-31 (internal cites omitted).
This Court recognized that supplemental instructions during deadlock serve a
legitimate purpose, namely, they allow the court to avoid the costs of retrial and "the
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possible loss of evidence that a new trial would entail." Id at 30.
Inasmuch as this Court has recognized the criticisms surrounding the conventional
Allen instruction, and it has embraced the analysis and concepts reflected in Lowenfield
and the ABA standards, this Court may disavow use of the traditional Allen charge in this
jurisdiction and support the ABA standards for deadlocked juries. The standards offer an
approved, non-coercive form of the supplemental instruction to a deadlocked jury
consistent with Lactod and Utah law for purposes of stare decisis. See_ State v. Menzies,
889 P.2d 393, 399 n.3 (Utah 1994) (stating vertical stare decisis "compels a court to
follow strictly the decisions rendered by a higher court"); see also Renn, 904 P.2d at 681
(recognizing this Court's authority to pronounce the law in this state).
Finally, where the State does not dispute that the error here was structural and that
Harry has established prejudice (see Brief of Appellee), this Court may reverse and
remand this case for a new trial on the possession charge.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth herein and as stated in the Brief of Appellant, Harry
respectfully requests that this Court reverse the conviction for felony possession and
remand the case for a new trial.
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